Introduction
Rapid and pervasive changes in land and water use amplified by climate change impacts have increased the pressure on water resources. Such developments have exposed the weakness of many current water governance and management systems (Pahl-Wostl, 2007a; Bates et al., 2008; Milly et al., 2008; Palmer et al., 2008; WWAP, 2009) . Water security for human needs is threatened, vulnerability to water related hazards and climate change impacts increases and the diversity of ecosystems is in continuous decline. The most persistent challenges for dealing with the emerging water crisis lie in the realm of water governance, and many problems can be attributed to governance failures rather than the condition of the resource base itself. Governance failures are a b s t r a c t
The most persistent obstacles for the sustainable management of water resources lie in the realm of water governance. Numerous recommendations often relying on simplistic 'standard' panaceas have been put forward for water governance reform without testing of appropriateness in diverse contexts. Here we present the first comprehensive comparative analysis of complex water governance and management systems in national river basins, compiling insights from 29 basins in developed and developing/emerging countries. To support a generic but contextual diagnostic approach an analytical framework was developed that makes a distinction between water governance regime, regime performance and environmental and socio-economic context. Results provide evidence that polycentric governance regimes characterized by a distribution of power but effective coordination structures have higher performance. This finding is valid for diverse contexts. The results show a weaker and more context dependent influence of legal frameworks on performance. The ability to respond to challenges from climate change is strongly related to polycentric governance and innovative ways for dealing with uncertainty. Furthermore, our results support findings that economic and institutional development often focuses on and leads to fulfilling needs of the human population at the expense of the environment. Rivers in comparatively good condition in countries with poor governance regimes highlight the urgent need to develop effective water governance structures in parallel to economic development.
These exploratory analyses provide valuable methodological and conceptual insights and pave the way for follow-up studies to build a comprehensive knowledge base on complex resource governance systems and diverse management practices worldwide.
# 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. manifold and affect both developing and industrialized countries albeit in different ways. In many developing countries corruption and the absence of civil society, a lack of efficiency and effectiveness of existing governance structures pose problems for any kind of development -not only for resource governance. Basic human needs are not satisfied for large parts of the population. In contrast, many industrialized countries suffer from over-regulation by rigid bureaucracies, sectoral fragmentation, unsustainable consumption patterns and a prevailing dominance of economic over environmental considerations.
Idealized design principles based on institutional and technological panaceas have been applied to water issues without long-term monitoring of their performance and effectiveness and without revision and critical reflection on practice that would have responded to failure earlier (Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Ingram, 2007; Gleick, 2003) . What seemed to work in one place was generalized to working everywhere, in particular, if such preferred solutions reflected the reigning paradigm of how things should be done (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2011a,b) . Preferences for institutional settings shifted from an unquestioned belief in governmental control to emphasizing the role of markets. Privatization -or private sector dominance in the provision of water services -has been promoted based on the belief that private companies operating in market-based settings would solve problems with inefficiency and ineffectiveness of government organizations. Experience is quite varied though with some striking failures -notably in developing countries (Bakker, 2010) . However, as much as privatization was praised by some as the only solution to increase efficiency and effectiveness in the provision of water related services it was fully dismissed by others when expectations did not hold to promise. Private sector involvement can trigger innovation and mobilize action in situations of institutional inertia and lack of governmental capacity. However, it cannot and should not replace government in its role to provide public goods and care for long-term economic, social and environmental sustainability. Numerous kinds of public-private partnerships have developed over time taking into account political, socio-economic and environmental conditions (Bakker, 2008 (Bakker, , 2010 .
The introduction of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) has been a bold step forward in the direction to embrace complexity. IWRM is particularly concerned with pursuing what might be termed an integrationist agenda: the integrated and coordinated management of water and land allows balancing resource protection whilst meeting social and ecological needs and promoting economic development (Odendaal, 2002) . The development of integrated river basin management plans was declared as prime goal at the Word Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 2002 without taking into account the limited capacity of many countries to implement even simpler legislation. IWRM has not held up to its promise and seems to be gradually being replaced by the concept of water security (Molle, 2008; Bakker, 2012) . Such conceptual development constitutes real progress only if it is not limited to general discourse but triggers structural change and implementation on the ground (PahlWostl et al., 2011a,b) . This requires developing capacity to learn from instances of success and failure.
To promote progress, expert voices have stressed the need for a radical paradigm shift to avoid the failures arising from not paying sufficient attention to complex interdependencies, human behavior and social institutions (Pahl-Wostl, 2007a ,b, 1995 Gleick, 2003; Holling and Meffe, 1996) . However, we are still quite far away from having an adequate knowledge base on the determinants of the dynamics and the performance trends of water governance and management systems in different socioeconomic and environmental contexts (Meinzen-Dick, 2007; Ingram, 2007) . Scientific analyses are mainly limited to individual case studies, and no comparative analyses of more than a few river basins exist that take into account the complexity and the multitude of processes characterizing water governance. The only more comprehensive study was conducted by Saleth and Dinar (2004) using an institutional economics approach.
To start closing this gap we conducted an exploratory comparative analysis of water governance regimes in river basins in Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa to understand how performance depends on characteristics of regimes and the context in which they are embedded. A governance regime refers to the interdependent long-lived structural features of a governance system. These include formal and informal institutions (=established rules and practices) and actor networks. A governance system is a broader notion, which encompasses structural features and transient processes at both rule making and operational levels. We make further a distinction between water governance and management. Management refers to activities of analyzing and monitoring, developing and implementing measures to keep the state of a water resource within desirable bounds. The notion of governance takes into account the different actors and networks that help formulate and implement water policy. Governance sets the rules under which management operates. Understanding the influence of governance regime characteristics on water management is thus a prerequisite for assessing the success or failure of and providing guidance for governance reform.
Framework of analysis
To support a generic but contextual diagnostic approach (Ostrom, 2007; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Young, 2008 Young, , 2011 we developed an analytical framework that makes a distinction between (a) water governance regime, (b) regime performance and (c) environmental and socio-economic context. A diagnostic approach should consider links between these three major elements, support context-sensitive analysis and assess the transferability of insights between similar classes of problems and contexts. As indicated in the diagram in Table 1 we first analyzed the relationships between regime characteristics and performance and explored in a second step if and how these relationships are influenced by contextual factors. Table 1 gives an overview over the measure chosen to characterize regime, performance and context, respectively. In the empirical analyses each measure was derived as a composite index from several indicators (cf. Appendix A in Supplementary Material). Apart from theoretical and normative considerations the choice of indicators was also determined by pragmatism: it should be possible to determine them in a consistent fashion for all case study basins without additional primary data collection. (82) e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 3 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 2 4 -3 4
The chosen regime characteristics embrace three major clusters: formal institutional settings, regime architecture and knowledge management.
Design and implementation of regulatory frameworks are the hallmark of governance reform. Many countries have introduced innovative water legislation in the past decade (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2011a,b) . Examples are the European Water Framework Directive, which came into force in 2000, or the South African National Water Act, which came into force in 1998, or the Russian Water Code issued in 2006. Such recent legislation typically adopts a more integrative approach, promotes flexibility in the choice of instruments to achieve environmental goals and introduces the basin principle ensuring governance at hydrological spatial scales. This shift toward integrated governance and management poses even higher demands to vertical (across spatial levels) and horizontal (across sectors) integration. To reduce problems of fit between administrative and biophysical boundaries new formal institutions have been introduced in most countries of the world operating on spatial scales following hydrological principles. As Moss (2007) highlighted problems of fit have often been solved at the expense of problems of interplay. Problems of vertical and horizontal interplay between newly established institutions at basin scale and those organized at traditional administrative boundaries (e.g. spatial planning, agriculture) prove to be a barrier for implementing integrated management approaches and may lead to overly complex structures (Borowski et al., 2008) . Hence the second cluster of regime characteristics in our analytical framework refers to regime architecture and attributes with central importance to vertical and horizontal coordination. Furthermore the overarching regime characteristic of polycentricity was analyzed.
The notion of polycentric political systems was introduced by Vincent Ostrom already some decades ago as a system 'of many centers of decision making which are formally independent of each other' (Ostrom et al., 1961) . Comprehensive treatises on polycentric governance in public policy can be found in Ostrom (1997) , McGinnis (1999a McGinnis ( ,b, 2000 and Heinelt (2002) . The concept has been further developed and has in recent years been extended to go beyond formal political systems (Ostrom, 2001 (Ostrom, , 2010a . More generally, polycentric governance systems are defined here as complex, modular systems where differently sized governance units with different purposes, organizations and spatial locations interact to form together systems characterized by many degrees of freedom at different levels. Multi-level governance in polycentric systems implies that decision making authority is distributed in a nested hierarchy and does not reside at one single level, neither top (only highest level government enforcing decisions), nor medium (only states/provinces enforce decisions beneficial for their region without considering others), nor individuals with complete freedom to act or e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 3 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 2 4 -3 4 being connected in a market structure only. From a normative point of view it is of major interest that polycentric systems are assumed to have a higher ability to adapt to a changing environment and to be less affected in their integrity by sudden changes or failure in parts of the system (Ostrom, 2001 (Ostrom, , 2010a Pahl-Wostl, 1995 , 2007a . The third cluster of regime characteristics refers to knowledge and information management. New modes of governance require new ways of knowledge generation and management to deal with increasing uncertainty and complexity (Berkes et al., 2003; Pahl-Wostl, 2007b) . Including a broader set of stakeholders gives access to different kinds of knowledge, which may be vital for a full assessment of a resource governance problem and for finding innovative solutions to deal with it (e.g. Berkes and Folke, 2002) . Transparency and empowerment of different social groups require that information is not hidden but shared (Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010; Mitchell, 2011) . Another important aspect is the institutionalization of practices for dealing with uncertainties (Pahl-Wostl, 2007a,b) .
Regarding performance measures three different kinds are distinguished:
process characteristics -such as the realization of good governance principles and of environmental management practices, governance regime's effectiveness with regard to the achievement of sustainability goals, adaptive capacity, which reflects the ability of a regime to deal with emerging challenges.
The formal implementation of legal prescriptions does not imply that good governance principles are realized in every day practice, even when explicitly stated in law. The realization of good governance principles is treated as measure for process performance. Table 1b lists the indicators taken into account. They were derived from the principles for good water governance stated by the Global Water Partnership (Rogers and Hall, 2003) .
Performance measures for the achievement of sustainability goals were the realized progress toward water related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the state of aquatic environment. Progress and implementation in climate change adaptation policies are considered as performance measure for a regime's adaptive capacity and thus its ability to respond to emerging challenges.
3.
Materials and methods
Case studies and data collection
The framework has been applied to compare 29 case studies (national river basins as well as national parts of transboundary basins) in Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. Considering the need to work with a very heterogeneous knowledge base a methodological approach was developed to bring the knowledge from the different case studies into a consistent and comparable format. A database with 98 indicators was developed using standardized case study questionnaires. Wherever appropriate, expert judgment was complemented by document analysis and information from international databases (cf. Appendix A in Supplementary Material). Composite measures for characterizing regime, performance and context were then derived by aggregating the scores of the underlying indicators as listed in Table 1 .
Comparative analyses
The comparative analyses are guided by a set of hypotheses relating regime characteristics to performance that reflect major assumptions currently discussed in research on effective and adaptive water and resource governance (PahlWostl, 2007a; Folke et al., 2005; Rogers and Hall, 2003; Lockwood et al., 2010) . Two complementary approaches guided by the set of hypotheses were applied to analyze the data from the 29 case studies: 1. Statistical investigation: Linear regression analyses were applied to the sets of composite performance, regime and context measures to assess the significance and strengths of associations before and after adjusting for context. 2. Qualitative and case-sensitive analysis: Cases were clustered in groups that either supported or contradicted assumptions made in the hypotheses, or in groups that did not allow a conclusion to be drawn either way. In case of contradictions, context factors were examined as potential explanations. The overall objective was to detect relationships between governance regime and performance and the influence of context on these relationships. Each of these approaches contributed its own strengths to the overall synthesis. To increase the robustness of the analyses small sets of composite measures (cf. Table 1) for performance (5), regime (7) and context (4) were derived by aggregating scores of individual indicators that were derived from the case study questionnaires.
Statistical modeling
Composite measures were standardized to values between 0 and 1, and relationships between them were analyzed using linear regression methods. Regression coefficients and associated statistical tests (F-ratio for regression model from analysis of variance table and t-statistic for specific coefficients) were used to summarize strengths of associations before and after adjusting for the context. Scores on performance measures were calculated by summing for each indicator the difference between the observed score and maximum possible score divided by the maximum possible score and then taking the total and dividing by the total number of indicators (n):
In this approach individual indicators were thus given equal weight, and all composite performance measures varied between 0 and 1. If responses on all indicators fell into the lowest performance category then the performance measure would be 0 and if all in highest category the measure would be 1. Alternative indices using unequal weights based on logical arguments about the relative importance of indicators were e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 2 3 ( 2 0 1 2 ) 2 4 -3 4 explored and rejected, as they yielded results highly correlated with simpler un-weighted indices. As the performance measures could take on many values, they were treated as continuous variables for further analysis using regression methods. An overall performance measure was also defined as the un-weighted average of the individual performance measures.
Composite regime measures were calculated from a set of contributing indicators in the same way as performance measures. One regime measure had a more complex definition: The idea of polycentricity (R3) is that power is distributed without loss of coordination. To capture this idea in a single index is difficult but was done here by considering two elements. First, if there is distribution of power to multiple centers with horizontal coordination. Second, if there is decentralization then it is with authority and capacity to act at lower levels.
Associations between regime and performance measures were adjusted where appropriate by context measures. Context measures were calculated from a set of contributing indicators in the same way as performance measures. Indicator sets for context measures were identified using exploratory factory analysis and then simplified further with logic. All four context measures were entered as candidate copredictors in the regression analyses but only those which were significant were retained in the final model.
Analyses were made using multiple linear regression routines in SPSS Version 16.0 software.
Qualitative examination of hypotheses
The qualitative assessment worked with a case-sensitive approach. Cases were ranked according to the presence of regime characteristics with positive influence on performance according to the different hypotheses. Cases were also ranked according to performance measures. Cases were then clustered in groups which supported or contradicted assumptions made in the hypotheses, or in groups that did not allow a conclusion to be drawn either way. Context factors were examined as potential explanations for major contradictions.
For each performance category aggregated measures were calculated by summing the numerical scores of several indicators, which were obtained by mapping the scores of each supporting indicator onto scale of 0-4.
For each hypothesis the relevant indicators for the regime characteristic under consideration were listed. For most regime characteristics the ranking of a basin regarding the regime characteristic was determined by the number of A scores (i.e. scores regarded as most positive) in the different indicators, which were treated as equal without giving any a special weight. This can be justified, since the emphasis is more on the low and high score groups. Nevertheless, this scoring was sometimes refined by noticing that one indicator was decisive and could not be compensated by scores of 'A' in other indicators (e.g. implementation of legal framework -cf. Supplementary Table B3 ). More information is given for each hypothesis tested in Supplementary Tables B1-B3. More information on methods and results of the comparative analyses is available in the Synthesis Report: http:// www.twin2go.uos.de/downloads/deliverables/170-d2-3-synthesis-report-v2.
Results
Our results support some of the general patterns stated by the hypotheses without supporting simple one-dimensional recipes. In most relationships between regime characteristics and performance considerable variation could be detected. In general, taking context into account helped to explain additional variation, but overall adjusting for context did not invalidate patterns of associations of regime characteristics with performance. Only for performance measure P1, achievement of water related MDGs, the socio-economic context was found to have an overriding influence (Table 2b ).
Regime architecture and knowledge management
The results confirm the importance of vertical and horizontal coordination for regime performance (Table 2a ). This is even more pronounced in the regime measure of polycentricity, which combines both modes of coordination. Our results support claims that polycentric systems are more adaptive and have a higher overall performance (Ostrom, 2010a) . The regime measure for polycentricity is strongly associated with the adoption of good governance principles including stakeholder engagement (P2), the presence of advanced climate change adaptation policies (P3) and aggregated performance (Table 2a) . We make a clear distinction between polycentricity and decentralization. Polycentric systems combine decentralization and a distribution of power and authority across levels with effective coordination. Bottom-up and top-down processes are balanced (Pahl-Wostl, 2009 ). Decentralization without coordination results in fragmentation with an assumed negative impact on performance.
To capture the importance of different regime architectures a classification has been developed to distinguish what may be called ideal types of polycentric, centralized and fragmented regimes (Table 3) . This classification has been applied in the qualitative case study analyses. The cases with the highest performance averaged across all measures can be classified as polycentric regimes (Supplementary Table B1 ). Regarding the low performing group one finds both centralized (e.g. Uzbekistan) and fragmented (e.g. India) regimes. The importance of polycentricity is not simply a spurious association that can be explained by the state of economic and institutional development (Table 2b ). Even though polycentric regimes are predominantly found in European countries, developing countries and transition economies worldwide may also display such characteristics (Nikitina et al., 2009 and Supplementary Table B1) .
The other most influential regime characteristic is advanced handling of uncertainties, which is positively associated with the realization of good governance principles and the presence of climate change adaptation policies (Table 2a  and Supplementary Table B2 ). Advanced handling of uncertainties implies taking into account different kinds of uncertainties (e.g. different perspectives, quantifiable variability of environmental parameters), favoring reversible and flexible options, use of scenarios and taking into account both short-term climate variability and long-term climate change.
The combination of polycentric regime architecture with capacities for an advanced handling of uncertainties is a move toward adaptive water governance and management in river basins (Pahl-Wostl, 2007a , 2009 Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007) .
Formal institutional settings
The presence of legal frameworks as well as the adoption of the basin principle (including the development of basin management plans) -hallmarks of water governance reform -are weakly associated with overall performance (Table 2a) . Both are associated with the adoption of good governance principles. Legal frameworks seem to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for overall high performance. The regime measure for legal frameworks comprises progress in and duration of implementation as well as contents and comprehensiveness of water related legislation. We do not find any country with overall high performance that does not have advanced legal frameworks in place. But quite a few countries with rather well developed legal frameworks perform poorly (Supplementary Table B3 ). In some cases, the capacity for implementation (knowledge, resources) is missing: South Africa has for example an excellent and ambitious legal framework, but faces serious problems in the implementation (Supplementary Table B3 , Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2008). Another important factor is the lacking general Performance measures relative to the maximum possible value for achievement of water-related MDGs (P1), realization of Good Governance Principles (P2), climate change adaptation policies (P3), state of the environment in river basins (P4), environmental management practice (P5) and overall performance aggregating all performance measures. Countries are listed in geographical groupings using the same color code as for (a). In case of missing data no performance measure was calculated. Different performance measures do not co-vary strongly: countries may score high on one dimension and low on another.
effectiveness of formal institutions as measured, in our analyses, by the Corruption Perception Index. If effectiveness is low, laws and management plans may exist on paper but are not applied in practice, or are poorly applied (Supplementary  Table B3 , Schlü ter et al., 2010) . In a country like Uzbekistan ineffectiveness of formal institutions and strong centralization lead to detrimental performance.
Socio-economic and environmental context
The influence of context was analyzed by using multiple regressions to adjust the associations between regime characteristics and performance by context measures (Table 2b) . Four aggregated measures were chosen covering the state of economic and institutional development, water availability, degree of watershed modification and basin size (Table 1c ). The overall state of economic and institutional development (C1) had a significant impact on the achievement of water related Millennium Development Goals (P1) and environmental management practices (P5). P1 is dominated by C1 so much so that after adjustment for such development the associations with several regime measures (R1, R3, R4, R6) that were not originally detected become significantly negatively associated with the remaining variation in P1 (Table 2b ). This finding also reflects that further strengthening of regime features in European basins cannot lead to further improvements on P1, as maximum scores have already been achieved (Fig. 1 ). P5 shows a positive correlation with C1, which seems to be the dominant factor for an increase in performance in this dimension. The association between knowledge and environmental management practices remained significant after taking context into account, but the associations with polycentricity and vertical integration disappeared (Table 2a  and b) .
Statistical analyses suggest a negative correlation between strong watershed modification (C3) and the state of the environment (P4) as might be expected, but still no significant association between governance regime and environmental performance after taking this context into account (Table 2b ). The lack of clear associations of governance regime characteristics with the state of the aquatic environment suggests that usually societies only act after environmental degradation has occurred. Furthermore, our analysis shows that financial resources are a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition for an increase in performance such as environmental management practices. There is significant variation in performance measures (i.e. good governance) for a certain state of economic development as measured by per capita GDP ( Supplementary Fig. B1 ). This may be of particular concern regarding maintaining or improving the state of the aquatic environment during economic development.
4.4.
Performance and geographical location Fig. 1 shows all performance measures in the various case studies grouped by geographic location. Regarding the state of the environment (P4), European countries are not the top performing group, whereas the Latin American group exhibits on average still good environmental conditions. We also note that quite a few rivers are still in comparatively good conditions in countries with poorly performing governance systems as reflected by the respect of good governance principles. In such cases, one can expect economic development along business-as-usual pathways to lead to severe degradation of the environment if effective water governance structures are not developed in parallel to at least attenuate negative environmental effects of economic development. Another notable finding is that that there is significant variation across performance measures, and one cannot simply distinguish between low and high performing regions in general but must have a more careful look at the different performance dimensions.
Discussion and conclusions
It is in the nature of an exploratory study as presented in this paper that it provides first insights. But even more it identifies priorities for follow-up studies and paves the way for further conceptual and methodological developments. Our analyses suggest that an important condition for improving performance is striving for more polycentric structures. Striving for polycentricity allows river basins, regions and countries to find their own path rather than following narrowly prescribed recipes (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Ostrom, 2010a,b) . It creates possibilities of responding at different spatial scales as well as dealing with heterogeneity in impacts and capacities among different places or subbasins. The distribution of authority among centers in a polycentric regime further enables place-specific responses to heterogeneity and uncertainties that a centralized system would make difficult. We are aware of the fact that the operationalization of polycentricity in our analyses is quite coarse. What can be called a polycentric system embraces a wide range of possible system configurations. To make the concept more useful a refinement is needed to identify the nature of the distribution of power and of cooperation structures, and the interplay between different governance modes -markets, networks and bureaucratic hierarchies (Pahl-Wostl, 2009 ).
Much emphasis has been given to legal frameworks and management plans in water governance reform. However, our findings show that such reforms are quite futile in countries with limited statehood where formal institutions are not effective. In such cases the national level may not be the most promising level for intervention, and one should rather consider supporting bottom-up informal processes to develop civil society and local governance capacity (Ostrom, 2005; Pahl-Wostl, 2009 ). However, informal institutions and informal actor networks can also be an impediment to innovation and learning. This is evident from the analyses we present in this paper, which support results we obtained earlier in a detailed case study analysis of water governance and management in Uzbekistan (Schlü ter et al., 2010) . One finds such a competing relationship between informal and formal institutions particularly in countries with high corruption and thus ineffective formal institutions, which leads to a decline of economic, social and environmental sustainability (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004 ). An issue to be addressed in further systematic analyses are factors which determine the nature of the interplay between formal and informal institutions and conditions where informal institutions substitute ineffective formal arrangements and lead to more sustainable management of environmental resources (Ostrom, 2005; Pahl-Wostl, 2009 ).
To deal with these open questions we advocate a two-track approach: extend and improve our current database using the methodology developed, and employ the insights gained to set priorities for in-depth analyses collecting new data on aspects that have proven to be critical in prior analyses. More studies of river basins in the United States, Australia and other developed economies would be valuable to strengthen geographical coverage. Broader insights from rapidly emerging countries are required for assessing strategies to balance different dimensions of development. Additional and better indicators to describe social and political dimensions of context will enable more fine-grained analyses of how and where context matters -our current measures of context focused primarily on levels of institutional and economic development and static measures of the state of the environment (i.e. water availability). It would be desirable to have comparable time series of data that allow developing indicators capturing trends (e.g. pressure on the water resource) and include as well infrastructure development.
Our paper provides clear evidence for the importance of such comparative analyses across a range of case studies to deepen the scientific understanding of complex resource governance systems and to develop evidence-based policy advice. In the long-term a real breakthrough can only be achieved if the scientific community develops and uses shared frameworks not only for synthesis but already for research design, data collection and analyses (Ostrom, 2007; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010) . Such practice does not limit creativity and theoretical diversity.
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